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)
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__________________________ )
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding.

DON L. BYBEE
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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STATEMENTS OF THE CASE
The issues raised by the Appellant are entirely
procedural in nature.

The sole issue is whether a District

Court Judge has the authority to renew prior judgments by
incorporating them into a subsequent judgment.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The order of the Honorable Jay E. Banks of September 8, 1977 was that the prior judgment of February 4,
1970 would not be reincorporated into a new judgment for child
support arrearages which had incurred after February 4, 1970.
Judge Banks advised the Respondent that she would have to collect the support arrearages from the Appellant and that any child
support arrearages which had accrued since February of 1970 would
be part of a new judgment.

Respondent, therefore, filed a new

complaint and served Appellant personally with summons and
complaint before the eight (8) year limitation period had run.
Appellant failed to answer the complaint and Respondent properly
took default judgment to renew the February 4, 1970 judgment.
The Honorable G. Hal Taylor properly denied Appellant's
motion to set aside the default judgment which, in effect, renewed the February 4, 1970 judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent was awarded a decree of divorce from the
Appellant on April 15, 1959 in the Third Judicial District Court.
The decree required Appellant to pay Respondent the sum of $50.00
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per month per child as child support and further ordered the
Appellant to pay the Respondent the sum of $50.00 per month as
alimony.

Respondent brought an order to show cause proceeding

against Appellant for the nonpayment of past due support payments.

Judge Bryant H. Croft heard the matter on May 5, 1966

and entered judgment in favor of the Respondent for the sum of
$300.00 for past due support payments, together with interest
thereon at the rate of eight per cent per annum on May 9, 1966.
Appellant was further ordered to continue to make the payments
of $100.00 per month to the Respondent for and on behalf of
the two minor children.

Respondent brought a further order to

show cause proceeding against Appellant for additional nonpayment
of support and the matter was heard on November 7, 1966 before
the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson.

Judge Anderson entered a judgment

against the Appellant for the sum of $500.00 for past due support,
together with interest thereon at the rate of eight percent per
annum on November 21, 1966.

Respondent filed an additional order

to show cause proceeding for additional support due and the matter
was heard before the Honorable Emmett H. Brown on February 2, 1970.
Judge Brown assigned a judgment for delinquent alimony and
attorney fees and order, dated February 4, 1970.

sup~ort,

As part of the

order, Respondent was awarded judgment in the sum of $11,705.00
representing the total amount by which Appellant was delinquent
in alimony and support payments from April of 1959 through December 31, 1969, excluding interest and including all prior judgments
entered during that time.
Respondent brought an order to show cause proceeding
against
Appellant for nonpayment of support, dental expenses,
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and other items which matters were heard before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft on February 17, 1976.

The Appellant was re-

presented by Thomas A. Jones at that hearing and the Appellant
stipulated in open court to the judgment of February 4, 1970 for
the child support arrearages of $11,705.00.

He further stipulated

to pay ongoing support, the outstanding dental expenses for the
minor children, and other items.

An order incorporating these

items was signed by Judge Croft to this effect on March 30, 1976.
Respondent filed an order to show cause in re declaration of
contempt against Appellant for additional delinquent support payments, nonpayment of the dental expenses and other items.

The

matter was heard initially before the Honorable Jay E. Banks on
April 25, 1977.

Judge Banks awarded the Respondent $150.00 for

support arrearages, $374.98 for dental expenses, etc.

Judge

Ban~·

order in regard to paragraph 2 entered in September of 1977 stated
that no judgment would be granted on judgments or arrearages heretofore entered.

Judge Banks intended by this order that he would

not incorporate the prior judgment of February 4, 1970 for the
sum of $11,705.00 into his judgment, and, therefore, granted
judgment of $150.00 for child support arrearages for the sum
due and owing since Februaryof 1970.

Judge Banks did not prevent

the Respondent from renewing her judgment against the Appellant
for $11,705.00 entered on February 4, 1970.
Respondent filed a complaint to renew the judgment
of February 4, 1970 on March 15, 1977 under Civil No. 241218
and personally served the Appellant with a copy of the complaint
and summons on April 18, 1977.

The Appellant failed to respond
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to the complaint within twenty days and the Respondent took
default judgment on July 6, 1977, which, in effect, renewed her
former judgment against the Appellant.

The Appellant was

allowed two and one half months to answer Respondent's complaint
and failed to do so before the Respondent took default judgment.
Appellant moved

~he

court to set aside the default judgment of

the Respondent which renewed the February 4, 1970 judgment of
$11,705.00.

The matter was heard on July 6, 1978 before the

Honorable G. Hal Taylor. Judge Taylor advised Appellant's counsel
that his answer admitted the allegations set forth in the
Respondent's complaint on March 15, 1977 and that the Appellant
has no affirmative defenses.

Judge Taylor denied the Appellant's

motion leaving the Respondent's judgment of July 6, 1977 in full
force and effect.

The only valid defense which Appellant could

have raised to the Respondent's complaint would have been proof
of payment which was obviously indefensable by Appellant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of July 6, 1978
of Judge G. Hal Taylor affirmed, wherein Judge Taylor denied
the Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment.

Respondent

further requests the finding of this court that the judgment of
July 6, 1977 was the proper renewal of a former judgment dated
February 4, 1970.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT PROPERLY RENEWED THE
JUDGMENT OF FEBRUARY 4, 1970 WITHIN THE EIGHT (8) YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATION PERIOD IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 78-12-22, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, reads as follows:
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment or
decree of any court of the United States, or of
any State or territory within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support or
maintenance for dependent children.
The past due installment payments for child support due and owing
to the Respondent by the Appellant from April 15, 1959 to May of
1966 were reduced to judgment on May 9, 1966 or within the eight
year limitation period.

Another judgment was entered against the

Appellant on November 21, 1966 for additional child support arrearages within the statutory limitation period set forth in Section
78-12-22 of the Utah Code.

The Appellant failed to pay child sup-

port payments between November 12, 1966 and December of 1969

whi~

resulted in the entry of a judgment of February 4, 1970 by the
Honorable Emmett H. Brown.

Judge Brown incorporated the judgments

of May 9, 1966 and November 21, 1966 into his judgment of February
4, 1970.

A district judge has the authority and discretion to

incorporate prior judgments for child support and alimony arrearages
into a subsequent judgment.

The judgment of February 4, 1970

contained all child support arrearages from the date of the decree
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of the divorce through December of 1969.

All past due child

support and alimony arrearages were reduced to judgment within
a period of eight (8) years after the same became due in accordance with Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The judgment of February 4, 1970 was properly renewed
by the Respondent.

She filed a complaint to renew the judgment of

February 4, 1970 on March 15, 1977 and personally served the Appellant with a copy of the complaint and summons on April 18, 1977.
The Appellant failed to answer the Respondent's complaint within a
period of twenty days and, as a result thereof, the Respondent
took default judgment on July 6, 1977.

The judgment of February

4, 1970 was properly renewed within the eight year period of
limitations in compliance with Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code.
The eight year period of limitations upon a final judgment applies
to past due unpaid installments under a divorce decree for alimony
or support of minor children.
684 (1975).

Seeley v. Park, Utah 2d, 532 P.2d

The Supreme Court of the State of California held

that the revival of a judgment by motion resulted in the new
judgment having the same force and effect as would an original
judgment.

Betty v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 18 Cal.2d.,

619, 116 P.2d 947 (1941).

The Respondent has authority to renew her

judgment every eight years in compliance with Section 78-12-22 of
the Utah Code Annotated in order to preserve her rights to collect
for child support and alimony arrearages in the future and, at a
point in time, when the Appellant is solvent and she is in a
position to collect the same.

There is no statutory or common

law prohibition in the State of Utah from the continuous renewal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of judgments each and every successive eight years as long
as each judgment is properly renewed within the eight year
statutory time period.
A proceeding was brought in the State of Kansas to
revive past due installment payments provided for by a divorce
decree.

The father answered and moved to set aside a previous

order to revive.

The district court overruled the father's

motion and granted the mother's motion to revive; but the order
of revivor did not include installments less than five years old.
The father appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas.

The Supreme

Court held that the attack made by the father on the judgment
entered was a collateral attack upon the judgment.

The

installme~

payments ripened into final judgment by becoming due and the
judgment remained unpaid for more than seven years.

The motion

to revive such judgments during the seven year period immediately
preceding revived such installments which had become dormant

und~j

the Kansas statute for a two-year period and also determined the
amount due on unpaid payments for a five-year period immediately
preceding the order.

The total sum was included in the order

and constituced a judgment.
P.2d 77 (1970).

Riney v. Riney, 205 Kan. 671, 473

The Kansas Supreme Court held that a judgment

which had been entered in a case and which has become final cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding unless
the judgment is void.

Id. at 77.

The Supreme Court of Kansas

further held that a party may by the issuance of execution
every five years, keep a judgment alive indefinitely.
In Friesen v. Friesen, 196 Kan. 319, 410 P.2d 429 (19661
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the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a district court decision to
enter a judgment dated September 20, 1957, reviewing all child
support payments due under a divorce decree from September 1,
1950 to August 1, 1952.

The district court, however, went

further and included in the total judgment which it entered in
favor of the plaintiff all unpaid child support payments under
the order of the court in the divorce action which were due and
owing for the immediate preceding five years.

No appeal was

taken, no exceptions were issued or anything further done with
respect to this judgment until a subsequent motion on October 2,
1963, was filed to revive the judgment of September 20, 1957.
The appellant-father contended that the judgment was void to
the extent that the court could not reduce a number of monthly
judgments, not yet dormant, to a lump sum judgment.

The Supreme

Court held that when a judgment has been entered in a case and
has become final, it cannot be collaterally attacked in a
subsequent proceeding unless it appears the judgment is void.
See also McFadden v. McFadden, 187 Kan., 398, 357 P.2d 751 (1960 ).
In the case at bar, the prior 1966 judgments of Respondent were
properly incorporated into the judgment of February 4, 1970.
The Appellant is not in a position to collaterally attack the
February 4, 1970 judgment and its renewal in 1977 as the original
judgment of February 4, 1970 was valid and has full force and
effect.
The Appellant stipulated in open court before the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft as to the validity of the judgment of
February 4, 1970 on February 17, 1976.

He cannot now collaterally

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attack the same judgment.

A judgment which is rendered on

a stipulation is conclusive of everything adjudicated by it,
and it may not be collaterally attacked by a party to it.

Klinker v. Klinker, 193 Cal.2d 687, 283 P.2d 83 (1955).

POINT II
APPELLANT HAS SET FORTH NO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO JUSTIFY THE
SETTING ASIDE OF THE RENEWED JUDGMENT DATED JULY 6, 1977 OBTAINED
BY RESPONDENT.
A dormant judgment may be revived and the obligation
may be renewed by an independent suit thereon prosecuted prior to
the time the judgment becomes dead.

State ex. rel. Commissioners

of Land Office v. Whitfield, 200 Okla., 300 193 P.2d 306 (1948).

TI

Respondent in the case at bar property renewed her judgment of
February 4, 1970 by an independent suit filed in the Third Judicial
District Court on March 15, 1977.

The Appellant failed to answer

to Respondent's complaint under the new action in Civil No.
241218 or even under the original case file (Civil No. 117445).
The Appellant, in fact, failed to respond to Respondent's
complaint for a period of two and one half months, at which time,
the Respondent took a default judgment on July 6, 1977.

Despite

the fact Respondent failed to serve the complaint and summons
without the Civil No. on the face thereof, the Appellant failed
to answer the complaint even under the original file number (Civil
No. 117445).

After the Appellant moved to set aside the default

judgment of July 6, 1977, the Appellant submitted a proposed
answer admitting the allegations of the complaint in Respondent"s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The only defenses that can be made in a proceeding
to revive a dormant judgment are the non-existence of the judgment,
payment or satisfaction thereof, or invalidity thereof appearing
on the face of the judgment roll.
Okla.483, 137 P.2d 589 (1943).

Shefts v. Oklahoma Co., 192

The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard

a matter on appeal dealing with the proceeding to revive a divorce
action after the death of the husband following the entry of the
divorce decree.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the

proceedings were timely brought under a statute to revive the
action upon the death of the judgment debtor: namely, the deceased
husband.

The general rule is that the only defenses available

to an order of revivor are the non-existence of a judgment, sought
to be revived, payment and satisfaction of such judgment, or invalidity of judgment which is apparent on the face of the judgment
roll.

Whitman v. Whitman,

(Okla.),

397 P.2d 664 (1964).

It is

clear that the Appellant can not argue the non-existence of the
judgment.
4,1970.

The judgment is clearly of record entered on February
The complaint filed on March 15, 1977 clearly sets forth

the existence of the judgment of February 4, 1970 and that the
Appellant has not paid or satisfied the same.

There is no

indication or allegation by the Appellant as to the invalidity
on the face of the judgment entered on February 4, 1970 or of
the default judgment entered on July 6, 1977.

The Appellant had

adequate time in which to answer the Respondent's complaint by
a proper affirmative defense.

The fact that the Appellant had

not paid or satisfied the judgment of $11,705.00 did not give
the Appellant a position of which to contest the entry of default
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment which revived the initial judgment of February 4, 1970.
Any defenses which the Appellant may have desired to have raised
in May of 1966, November of 1966 or in February of 1970 should
have been raised timely at those hearings.

All of those matters

are now at res judicata and were incorporated as part of the
judgment of February 4, 1970.

This judgment has now been properly

revived in 1977 without affirmative defenses by the Appellant.

POINT III
THE FACT THAT NO CIVIL NUMBER WAS
PUT ON THE FACE OF THE COMPLAINT
FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF
FEBRUARY 4, 1970 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ANY ERROR TO JUSTIFY THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON JULY
6, 1977.
The Appellant argues that the Respondent attached
the complaint and summons to an order to show cause proceeding.
The Appellant fails to state the proper facts.

The Appellant

was personally served with the complaint and summons on April
18, 1977 after the same had been filed in the Third Judicial
District Court on March 15, 1977.

It is true that the complaint

and summons served on Appellant had no civil number on the face
of the complaint and summons.

The Appellant, however, failed to

file any answer in either case number 117445, the original file,
or 24128, the new file.

Appellant was personally served with the

copy of the complaint and summons and could have appropriately
answered the allegations set forth in the Respondent's complaint.
He, however, failed to respond to the Respondent's complaint resuiting in a default judgment on July 6, 1977.

This permitted the
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Appellant a period of two and one half months in which to answer
the complaint if he had wanted to raise any affirmative defenses.
There were, however, no affirmative defenses which could have been
raised by the Appellant as pointed out in Point II of this Brief.
The service of the complaint and summons without the Civil No. is
merely a technical mistake and did not deprive the Appellant of his
right to set forth affirmative defenses in a timely manner.

The

Arizona Court of Appeals held that the identity of a judgment sought
to be renewed is capable of being ascertained from the face of the
renewal affidavit and technical omissions or error in the affidavit
would not defeat the renewal of the judgment.
25 Ariz. App. 50, 540 P.2d 1269 (1975).

Weltsch v. O'Brien.

In this case the judgment

creditor renewed his judgment be appropriate pleadings.

The affi-

davit intended to effect the renewal of the judgment, which contained
the names of parties to the judgment sought to be renewed, civil cause
number of judgment, date of judgment and information as to where
the judgment was recorded, sufficiently and was considered to have
sufficiently identified the judgment sought to be renewed,despite
the omission in the clerk's docket number and page number since
the provision of the statute allowing the renewal of judgments bJ
the affidavit indicate that either judgments which had been docketed
or those which had been recorded could be renewed.

The court held

that the judgment renewal affidavit was not invalid for failing to
list beneficial owners of the judgment sought to be renewed for
such affidavit contained the name of the owner and the judgment
for purposes of collection.

The Supreme Court of Kansas in Riney

v. Riney, 205 Kan., 671 473 P.2d 77 (1970) held that in matters
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pertaining to the revivor of dormant judgments where there is
no special reason for strict formality of procedure, the existence
of irregularities does not render void the judicial process by
which parties endeavor to maintain their rights.
It is the Respondent's position in this case that there
has been no error as a result of the absence of the civil number on
the complaint and summons served upon the Appellant personally on
April 18, 1977.

The Appellant received complaint and summons

which clearly stated the nature of the renewal of the prior
judgment on its face.

It was clear from the face of the pleading

itself that the Appellant could have discovered that the purpose
of the complaint was to revive the judgment of February 4, 1970.
If the Appellant had wanted to raise any defenses, he could have
filed an answer under the original action or the renewal action
and mailed a copy to Respondent.

The Appellant, however, filed no

answer in either Civil No. 117445 or 241218.

Respondent properly

entered default judgment against the Appellant in Civil No. 241218,
the revival action to renew the judgment of February 4, 1970.

CONCLUSION
The Respondent properly renewed the judgment of
February 4, 1970 within the eight year period of limitations as
set forth in Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code.

The Appellant

had adequate opportunity to raise any affirmative defenses against
the renewal of this judgment.

The Appellant did not, however,

respond to the complaint of March 15, 1977.

It is clear that the

Appellant had no affirmative defenses in the form of the nonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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existence of the original judgment, payment or satisfaction
thereof, or the invalidity appearing on the face of the judgment roll.

Therefore, the Appellant was in no position to

raise any affirmative defenses against the renewal of the
judgment of February 4, 1970.

The district court had full

discretion in incorporating the judgments in 1966 into the
judgment of February 4, 1970.

All of the judgments obtained

by the Respondent against the Appellant were for past due installments which had accrued within a period of eight years
prior to the time they became due and owing in accordance with
Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code.

Respondent has full authority

to renew her judgment against the Appellant on a continous basis
within a period of eight years in order to assure her the right
of collection to which she is entitled.

The absence of the civil

number on the complaint and summons served upon the Appellant is
merely a mistake and does not consititute error sufficient to
set aside the default judgment of July 6, 1977.

The Appellant

had adequate opportunity to have filed an answer in either civil
case, which he jid not elect to do.

Therefore, Respondent respect-

fully requests this court to affirm the decision of Judge G. Hal
Taylor of July 6, 1978 in denying the Appellant's motion to set
aside default judgment.

Respondent further requests the above-

entitled court to enter its finding that the judgment of July 6,
1977 was the proper renewal of the judgment of February 4, 1970 in
accordance with Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code.
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